Level 3

Proxy Voting Policy and Guidelines - AWM

Passion to Perform
I. INTRODUCTION

AWM has adopted and implemented the following policies and procedures, which it believes are reasonably designed to ensure that proxies are voted in the best economic interest of clients, in accordance with its fiduciary duties and local regulation. These Proxy Voting Policies, Procedures and Guidelines shall apply to all accounts managed by US domiciled advisers and to all US client accounts managed by non US regional offices. Non US regional offices are required to maintain procedures and to vote proxies as may be required by law on behalf of their non US clients. In addition, AWM’s proxy policies reflect the fiduciary standards and responsibilities for ERISA accounts.

The attached guidelines represent a set of global recommendations that were determined by the Global Proxy Voting Sub-Committee (“the GPVSC”). These guidelines were developed to provide AWM with a comprehensive list of recommendations that represent how AWM will generally vote proxies for its clients. The recommendations derived from the application of these guidelines are not intended to influence the various AWM legal entities either directly or indirectly by parent or affiliated companies. In addition, the organizational structures and documents of the various AWM legal entities allows, where necessary or appropriate, the execution by individual AWM subsidiaries of the proxy voting rights independently of any DB parent or affiliated company. This applies in particular to non U.S. fund management companies. The individuals that make proxy voting decisions are also free to act independently, subject to the normal and customary supervision by the management/boards of these AWM legal entities.

II. AWM’S PROXY VOTING RESPONSIBILITIES

Proxy votes are the property of AWM’s advisory clients. As such, AWM’s authority and responsibility to vote such proxies depend upon its contractual relationships with its clients. AWM has delegated responsibility for effecting its advisory clients’ proxy votes to Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), an independent third-party proxy voting specialist. ISS votes AWM’s advisory clients’ proxies in accordance with AWM’s proxy guidelines or AWM’s specific instructions. Where a client has given specific instructions as to how a proxy should be voted, AWM will notify ISS to carry out those instructions. Where no specific instruction exists, AWM will follow the procedures in voting the proxies set forth in this document. Certain Taft-Hartley clients may direct AWM to have ISS vote their proxies in accordance with Taft Hartley voting Guidelines

Clients may in certain instances contract with their custodial agent and notify AWM that they wish to engage in securities lending transactions. In such cases, it is the responsibility of the custodian to deduct the number of shares that are on loan so that they do not get voted twice.

III. POLICIES

1. Proxy voting activities are conducted in the best economic interest of clients

AWM has adopted the following policies and procedures to ensure that proxies are voted in accordance with the best economic interest of its clients, as determined by AWM in good faith after appropriate review.

2. The Global Proxy Voting Sub-Committee

For purposes of these Policies and Procedures, “clients” refers to persons or entities: for which AM serves as investment adviser or sub-adviser; for which AM votes proxies; and that have an economic or beneficial ownership interest in the portfolio securities of issuers soliciting such proxies.
The Global Proxy Voting Sub-Committee (the “GPVSC”) is an internal working group established by the applicable AWM’s Investment Risk Oversight Committee pursuant to a written charter. The GPVSC is responsible for overseeing AWM’s proxy voting activities, including:

(i) adopting, monitoring and updating guidelines, attached as Exhibit A (the “Guidelines”), that provide how AWM will generally vote proxies pertaining to a comprehensive list of common proxy voting matters;

(ii) voting proxies where (A) the issues are not covered by specific client instruction or the Guidelines; (B) the Guidelines specify that the issues are to be determined on a case-by-case basis; or (C) where an exception to the Guidelines may be in the best economic interest of AWM’s clients; and

(iii) monitoring the Proxy Vendor Oversight’s proxy voting activities (see below).

AWM’s Proxy Vendor Oversight, a function of AWM’s Operations Group, is responsible for coordinating with ISS to administer AWM’s proxy voting process and for voting proxies in accordance with any specific client instructions or, if there are none, the Guidelines, and overseeing ISS’ proxy responsibilities in this regard.

3. availability of proxy voting policies and procedures and proxy voting record

Copies of these Policies and Procedures, as they may be updated from time to time, are made available to clients as required by law and otherwise at AWM’s discretion. Clients may also obtain information on how their proxies were voted by AWM as required by law and otherwise at AWM’s discretion; however, AWM must not selectively disclose its investment company clients’ proxy voting records. The Proxy Vendor Oversight will make proxy voting reports available to advisory clients upon request. The investment companies’ proxy voting records will be disclosed to shareholders by means of publicly-available annual filings of each company’s proxy voting record for 12-month periods ended June 30 (see “Recordkeeping” below), if so required by relevant law.

IV. PROCEDURES

The key aspects of AWM’s proxy voting process are as follows:

1. The GPVSC’s Proxy Voting Guidelines

The Guidelines set forth the GPVSC’s standard voting positions on a comprehensive list of common proxy voting matters. The GPVSC has developed, and continues to update the Guidelines based on consideration of current corporate governance principles, industry standards, client feedback, and the impact of the matter on issuers and the value of the investments.

The GPVSC will review the Guidelines as necessary to support the best economic interests of AWM’s clients and, in any event, at least annually. The GPVSC will make changes to the Guidelines, whether as a result of the annual review or otherwise, taking solely into account the best economic interests of clients. Before changing the Guidelines, the GPVSC will thoroughly review and evaluate the proposed change and the reasons therefore, and the GPVSC Chair will ask GPVSC members whether anyone outside of the AWM organization (but within Deutsche Bank and its affiliates) or any entity that identifies itself as a AWM advisory client has requested or attempted to influence the proposed change and whether any member has a conflict of interest with respect to the proposed change. If any such matter is reported to the GPVSC Chair, the Chair will promptly notify the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee (see below) and will defer the approval, if possible. Lastly, the GPVSC will fully document its rationale for approving any change to the Guidelines.
The Guidelines may reflect a voting position that differs from the actual practices of the public company(ies) within the Deutsche Bank organization or of the investment companies for which AWM or an affiliate serves as investment adviser or sponsor. Investment companies, particularly closed-end investment companies, are different from traditional operating companies. These differences may call for differences in voting positions on the same matter. Further, the manner in which AWM votes investment company proxies may differ from proposals for which an AWM-advised or sponsored investment company solicits proxies from its shareholders. As reflected in the Guidelines, proxies solicited by closed-end (and open-end) investment companies are generally voted in accordance with the pre-determined guidelines of ISS. See Section IV.3.B.

Funds (“Underlying Funds”) in which Topiary Fund Management Fund of Funds (each, a “Fund”) invest, may from time to time seek to revise their investment terms (i.e. liquidity, fees, etc.) or investment structure. In such event, the Underlying Funds may require approval/consent from its investors to effect the relevant changes. Topiary Fund Management has adopted Proxy Voting Procedures which outline the process for these approvals.

2. Specific proxy voting decisions made by the GPVSC

The Proxy Vendor Oversight will refer to the GPVSC all proxy proposals (i) that are not covered by specific client instructions or the Guidelines; or (ii) that, according to the Guidelines, should be evaluated and voted on a case-by-case basis.

Additionally, if, the Proxy Vendor Oversight, the GPVSC Chair or any member of the GPVSC, a portfolio manager, a research analyst or a sub-adviser believes that voting a particular proxy in accordance with the Guidelines may not be in the best economic interests of clients, that individual may bring the matter to the attention of the GPVSC Chair and/or the Proxy Vendor Oversight.2

If the Proxy Vendor Oversight refers a proxy proposal to the GPVSC or the GPVSC determines that voting a particular proxy in accordance with the Guidelines is not in the best economic interests of clients, the GPVSC will evaluate and vote the proxy, subject to the procedures below regarding conflicts.

The GPVSC endeavors to hold meetings to decide how to vote particular proxies sufficiently before the voting deadline so that the procedures below regarding conflicts can be completed before the GPVSC’s voting determination.

3. Certain proxy votes may not be cast

In some cases, the GPVSC may determine that it is in the best economic interests of its clients not to vote certain proxies. If the conditions below are met with regard to a proxy proposal, AWM will abstain from voting:

- Neither the Guidelines nor specific client instructions cover an issue;
- ISS does not make a recommendation on the issue;
- The GPVSC cannot convene on the proxy proposal at issue to make a determination as to what would be in the client’s best interest. (This could happen, for example, if the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-committee found that there was a material conflict or if despite all best efforts being made, the GPVSC quorum requirement could not be met).

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2 The Proxy Vendor Oversight generally monitors upcoming proxy solicitations for heightened attention from the press or the industry and for novel or unusual proposals or circumstances, which may prompt the Proxy Vendor Oversight to bring the solicitation to the attention of the GPVSC Chair. AM portfolio managers, AM research analysts and sub-advisers also may bring a particular proxy vote to the attention of the GPVSC Chair, as a result of their ongoing monitoring of portfolio securities held by advisory clients and/or their review of the periodic proxy voting record reports that the GPVSC Chair distributes to AM portfolio managers and AM research analysts.
In addition, it is AWM’s policy not to vote proxies of issuers subject to laws of those jurisdictions that impose restrictions upon selling shares after proxies are voted, in order to preserve liquidity. In other cases, it may not be possible to vote certain proxies, despite good faith efforts to do so. For example, some jurisdictions do not provide adequate notice to shareholders so that proxies may be voted on a timely basis. Voting rights on securities that have been loaned to third-parties transfer to those third-parties, with loan termination often being the only way to attempt to vote proxies on the loaned securities. Lastly, the GPVSC may determine that the costs to the client(s) associated with voting a particular proxy or group of proxies outweighs the economic benefits expected from voting the proxy or group of proxies.

The Proxy Vendor Oversight will coordinate with the GPVSC Chair regarding any specific proxies and any categories of proxies that will not or cannot be voted. The reasons for not voting any proxy shall be documented.

### 4. Conflict of Interest Procedures

**A. Procedures to Address Conflicts of Interest and Improper Influence**

*Overriding Principle.* In the limited circumstances where the GPVSC votes proxies, the GPVSC will vote those proxies in accordance with what it, in good faith, determines to be the best economic interests of AWM’s clients.

*Independence of the GPVSC.* As a matter of Compliance policy, the GPVSC and the Proxy Vendor Oversight are structured to be independent from other parts of Deutsche Bank. Members of the GPVSC and the employee responsible for Proxy Vendor Oversight are employees of AWM. As such, they may not be subject to the supervision or control of any employees of Deutsche Bank Corporate and Investment Banking division (“CIB”). Their compensation cannot be based upon their contribution to any business activity outside of AWM without prior approval of Legal and Compliance. They can have no contact with employees of Deutsche Bank outside of the Private Client and Asset Management division (“PCAM”) regarding specific clients, business matters or initiatives without the prior approval of Legal and Compliance. They furthermore may not discuss proxy votes with any person outside of AWM (and within AWM only on a need to know basis).

*Conflict Review Procedures.* There will be a committee (the “Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee”) established within AWM that will monitor for potential material conflicts of interest in connection with proxy proposals that are to be evaluated by the GPVSC. Promptly upon a determination that a vote shall be presented to the GPVSC, the GPVSC Chair shall notify the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee. The Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee shall promptly collect and review any information deemed reasonably appropriate to evaluate, in its reasonable judgment, if AWM or any person participating in the proxy voting process has, or has the appearance of, a material conflict of interest. For the purposes of this policy, a conflict of interest shall be considered “material” to the extent that a reasonable person could expect the conflict to influence, or appear to influence, the GPVSC’s decision on the particular vote at issue. GPVSC should provide the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee a reasonable amount of time (no less than 24 hours) to perform all necessary and appropriate reviews. To the extent that a conflicts review cannot be sufficiently completed by the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee the proxies will be voted in accordance with the standard guidelines.

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3 As mentioned above, the GPVSC votes proxies (i) where neither a specific client instruction nor a Guideline directs how the proxy should be voted, (ii) where the Guidelines specify that an issue is to be determined on a case by case basis or (iii) where voting in accordance with the Guidelines may not be in the best economic interests of clients.

4 The Proxy Vendor Oversight, who serves as the non-voting secretary of the GPVSC, may receive routine calls from proxy solicitors and other parties interested in a particular proxy vote. Any contact that attempts to exert improper pressure or influence shall be reported to the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee.
The information considered by the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee may include without limitation information regarding (i) AWM client relationships; (ii) any relevant personal conflict known by the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee or brought to the attention of that sub-committee; (iii) and any communications with members of the GPVSC (or anyone participating or providing information to the GPVSC) and any person outside of the AWM organization (but within Deutsche Bank and its affiliates) or any entity that identifies itself as an AWM advisory client regarding the vote at issue. In the context of any determination, the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee may consult with, and shall be entitled to rely upon, all applicable outside experts, including legal counsel.

Upon completion of the investigation, the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee will document its findings and conclusions. If the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee determines that (i) AWM has a material conflict of interest that would prevent it from deciding how to vote the proxies concerned without further client consent or (ii) certain individuals should be recused from participating in the proxy vote at issue, the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee will so inform the GPVSC chair.

If notified that AWM has a material conflict of interest as described above, the GPVSC chair will obtain instructions as to how the proxies should be voted either from (i) if time permits, the effected clients, or (ii) in accordance with the standard guidelines. If notified that certain individuals should be recused from the proxy vote at issue, the GPVSC Chair shall do so in accordance with the procedures set forth below.

Note: Any AWM employee who becomes aware of a potential, material conflict of interest in respect of any proxy vote to be made on behalf of clients shall notify Compliance. Compliance shall call a meeting of the conflict review committee to evaluate such conflict and determine a recommended course of action.

Procedures to be followed by the GPVSC. At the beginning of any discussion regarding how to vote any proxy, the GPVSC Chair (or his or her delegate) will inquire as to whether any GPVSC member (whether voting or ex officio) or any person participating in the proxy voting process has a personal conflict of interest or has actual knowledge of an actual or apparent conflict that has not been reported to the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee.

The GPVSC Chair also will inquire of these same parties whether they have actual knowledge regarding whether any director, officer or employee outside of the AWM organization (but within Deutsche Bank and its affiliates) or any entity that identifies itself as a AWM advisory client, has: (i) requested that AWM, the Proxy Vendor Oversight (or any member thereof) or a GPVSC member vote a particular proxy in a certain manner; (ii) attempted to influence AWM, the Proxy Vendor Oversight (or any member thereof), a GPVSC member or any other person in connection with proxy voting activities; or (iii) otherwise communicated with a GPVSC member or any other person participating or providing information to the GPVSC regarding the particular proxy vote at issue, and which incident has not yet been reported to the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee.

If any such incidents are reported to the GPVSC Chair, the Chair will promptly notify the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee and, if possible, will delay the vote until the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee can complete the conflicts report. If a delay is not possible, the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee will instruct the GPVSC whether anyone should be recused from the proxy voting process, or whether AWM should vote the proxy in accordance with the standard guidelines, seek instructions as to how to vote the proxy at issue from ISS or, if time permits, the effected clients. These inquiries and discussions will be properly reflected in the GPVSC’s minutes.
Duty to Report. Any AWM employee, including any GPVSC member (whether voting or ex officio), that is aware of any actual or apparent conflict of interest relevant to, or any attempt by any person outside of the AWM organization (but within Deutsche Bank and its affiliates) or any entity that identifies itself as a AWM advisory client to influence, how AWM votes its proxies has a duty to disclose the existence of the situation to the GPVSC Chair (or his or her designee) and the details of the matter to the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee. In the case of any person participating in the deliberations on a specific vote, such disclosure should be made before engaging in any activities or participating in any discussion pertaining to that vote.

Recusal of Members. The GPVSC will recuse from participating in a specific proxy vote any GPVSC members (whether voting or ex officio) and/or any other person who (i) are personally involved in a material conflict of interest; or (ii) who, as determined by the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee, have actual knowledge of a circumstance or fact that could effect their independent judgment, in respect of such vote. The GPVSC will also exclude from consideration the views of any person (whether requested or volunteered) if the GPVSC or any member thereof knows, or if the Conflicts of Interest Management Sub-Committee has determined, that such other person has a material conflict of interest with respect to the particular proxy, or has attempted to influence the vote in any manner prohibited by these policies.

If, after excluding all relevant GPVSC voting members pursuant to the paragraph above, there are three or more GPVSC voting members remaining, those remaining GPVSC members will determine how to vote the proxy in accordance with these Policies and Procedures. If there are fewer than three GPVSC voting members remaining, the GPVSC Chair will vote the proxy in accordance with the standard guidelines, will obtain instructions as to how to have the proxy voted from, if time permits, the effected clients and otherwise from ISS.

B. Investment Companies and Affiliated Public Companies

Investment Companies. As reflected in the Guidelines, all proxies solicited by open-end and closed-end investment companies are voted in accordance with the pre-determined guidelines of ISS, unless the investment company client directs AWM to vote differently on a specific proxy or specific categories of proxies. However, regarding investment companies for which AWM or an affiliate serves as investment adviser or principal underwriter, such proxies are voted in the same proportion as the vote of all other shareholders (i.e., “mirror” or “echo” voting). Master fund proxies solicited from feeder funds are voted in accordance with applicable provisions of Section 12 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.

Subject to participation agreements with certain Exchange Traded Funds ("ETF") issuers that have received exemptive orders from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission allowing investing DWS funds to exceed the limits set forth in Section 12(d)(1)(A) and (B) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, AWM will echo vote proxies for ETFs in which Deutsche Bank holds more than 25% of outstanding voting shares globally when required to do so by participation agreements and SEC orders.

Affiliated Public Companies. For proxies solicited by non-investment company issuers of or within the Deutsche Bank organization, e.g., Deutsche bank itself, these proxies will be voted in the same proportion as the vote of other shareholders (i.e., “mirror” or “echo” voting).

Note: With respect to the Central Cash Management Fund (registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940), the Fund is not required to engage in echo voting and the investment adviser will use these Guidelines, and may determine, with respect to the Central Cash Management Fund, to vote contrary to the positions in the Guidelines, consistent with the Fund’s best interest.

C. Other Procedures That Limit Conflicts of Interest

AWM and other entities in the Deutsche Bank organization have adopted a number of policies, procedures and internal controls that are designed to avoid various conflicts of interest, including those that may arise in connection with proxy voting, including but not limited to:
Deutsche Bank
Compliance

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- Code of Business Conduct and Ethics - DB Group;
- Conflicts of Interest Policy - DB Group;
- Information Sharing Procedures – AWM;
- Code of Ethics - AWM; and
- Code of Professional Conduct - US.

The GPVSC expects that these policies, procedures and internal controls will greatly reduce the chance that the GPVSC (or, its members) would be involved in, aware of or influenced by, an actual or apparent conflict of interest.

V. RECORDKEEPING

At a minimum, the following types of records must be properly maintained and readily accessible in order to evidence compliance with this policy.

- AWM will maintain a record of each vote cast by AWM that includes among other things, company name, meeting date, proposals presented, vote cast and shares voted.

- The Proxy Vendor Oversight maintains records for each of the proxy ballots it votes. Specifically, the records include, but are not limited to:
  - The proxy statement (and any additional solicitation materials) and relevant portions of annual statements.
  - Any additional information considered in the voting process that may be obtained from an issuing company, its agents or proxy research firms.
  - Analyst worksheets created for stock option plan and share increase analyses.
  - Proxy Edge print-screen of actual vote election.

- AWM will retain these Policies and Procedures and the Guidelines; will maintain records of client requests for proxy voting information; and will retain any documents the Proxy Vendor Oversight or the GPVSC prepared that were material to making a voting decision or that memorialized the basis for a proxy voting decision.

- The GPVSC also will create and maintain appropriate records documenting its compliance with these Policies and Procedures, including records of its deliberations and decisions regarding conflicts of interest and their resolution.

- With respect to AWM’s investment company clients, ISS will create and maintain records of each company’s proxy voting record for 12-month periods ended June 30. AWM will compile the following information for each matter relating to a portfolio security considered at any shareholder meeting held during the period covered by the report and with respect to which the company was entitled to vote:
  - The name of the issuer of the portfolio security;
  - The exchange ticker symbol of the portfolio security (if symbol is available through reasonably practicable means);
  - The Council on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures number for the portfolio security (if the number is available through reasonably practicable means);
  - The shareholder meeting date;
  - A brief identification of the matter voted on;
  - Whether the matter was proposed by the issuer or by a security holder;
  - Whether the company cast its vote on the matter;
  - How the company cast its vote (e.g., for or against proposal, or abstain; for or withhold regarding election of directors); and
  - Whether the company cast its vote for or against management.
Note: This list is intended to provide guidance only in terms of the records that must be maintained in accordance with this policy. In addition, please note that records must be maintained in accordance with the applicable Records Management Policy - US.

With respect to electronically stored records, “properly maintained” is defined as complete, authentic (unalterable) usable and backed-up. At a minimum, records should be retained for a period of not less than six years (or longer, if necessary to comply with applicable regulatory requirements), the first three years in an appropriate AWM office.

VI. THE GPVSC’S OVERSIGHT ROLE

In addition to adopting the Guidelines and making proxy voting decisions on matters referred to it as set forth above, the GPVSC will monitor the proxy voting process by reviewing summary proxy information presented by ISS. The GPVSC will use this review process to determine, among other things, whether any changes should be made to the Guidelines. This review will take place at least quarterly and will be documented in the GPVSC’s minutes.
Attachment A – Global Proxy Voting Guidelines

Deutsche Asset Management
Global Proxy Voting Guidelines

As Amended February 2013
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These Guidelines may reflect a voting position that differs from the actual practices of the public company (ies) within the Deutsche Bank organization or of the investment companies for which AWM or an affiliate serves as investment adviser or sponsor.

NOTE: Because of the unique structure and regulatory scheme applicable to closed-end investment companies, the voting guidelines (particularly those related to governance issues) generally will be inapplicable to holdings of closed-end investment companies. As a result, determinations on the appropriate voting recommendation for closed-end investment company shares will be made on a case-by-case basis.

I. Board of Directors and Executives

A. Election of Directors

Routine: AWM Policy is to vote “for” the uncontested election of directors. Votes for a director in an uncontested election will be withheld in cases where a director has shown an inability to perform his/her duties in the best interests of the shareholders.

Proxy contest: In a proxy contest involving election of directors, a case-by-case voting decision will be made based upon analysis of the issues involved and the merits of the incumbent and dissident slates of directors. AWM will incorporate the decisions of a third party proxy research vendor, currently, Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) subject to review by the Proxy Voting Sub-Committee (GPVSC) as set forth in the AWM’s Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures.

Rationale: The large majority of corporate directors fulfill their fiduciary obligation and in most cases support for management’s nominees is warranted. As the issues relevant to a contested election differ in each instance, those cases must be addressed as they arise.

B. Classified Boards of Directors

AWM policy is to vote against proposals to classify the board and for proposals to repeal classified boards and elect directors annually.

Rationale: Directors should be held accountable on an annual basis. By entrenching the incumbent board, a classified board may be used as an anti-takeover device to the detriment of the shareholders in a hostile take-over situation.

C. Board and Committee Independence

AWM policy is to vote:

1. “For” proposals that require that a certain percentage (majority up to 66 2/3%) of members of a board of directors be comprised of independent or unaffiliated directors.

2. “For” proposals that require all members of a company's compensation, audit, nominating, or other similar committees be comprised of independent or unaffiliated directors.
3. “Against” shareholder proposals to require the addition of special interest, or constituency, representatives to boards of directors.

4. “For” separation of the Chairman and CEO positions.

5. “Against” proposals that require a company to appoint a Chairman who is an independent director.

Rationale: Board independence is a cornerstone of effective governance and accountability. A board that is sufficiently independent from management assures that shareholders’ interests are adequately represented. However, the Chairman of the board must have sufficient involvement in and experience with the operations of the company to perform the functions required of that position and lead the company.

No director qualifies as ‘independent' unless the board of directors affirmatively determines that the director has no material relationship with the listed company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company).

Whether a director is in fact not "independent" will depend on the laws and regulations of the primary market for the security and the exchanges, if any, on which the security trades.

D. Liability and Indemnification of Directors

AWM policy is to vote “for” management proposals to limit directors' liability and to broaden the indemnification of directors, unless broader indemnification or limitations on directors' liability would effect shareholders' interests in pending litigation.

Rationale: While shareholders want directors and officers to be responsible for their actions, it is not in the best interests of the shareholders for them to be too risk averse. If the risk of personal liability is too great, companies may not be able to find capable directors willing to serve. We support expanding coverage only for actions taken in good faith and not for serious violations of fiduciary obligation or negligence.

E. Qualifications of Directors

AWM policy is to follow management’s recommended vote on either management or shareholder proposals that set retirement ages for directors or require specific levels of stock ownership by directors.

Rationale: As a general rule, the board of directors, and not the shareholders, is most qualified to establish qualification policies.

F. Removal of Directors and Filling of Vacancies

AWM policy is to vote “against” proposals that include provisions that directors may be removed only for cause or proposals that include provisions that only continuing directors may fill board vacancies.

Rationale: Differing state statutes permit removal of directors with or without cause. Removal of directors for cause usually requires proof of self-dealing, fraud or misappropriation of corporate assets, limiting shareholders' ability to remove directors except under extreme circumstances. Removal without cause requires no such showing.

Allowing only incumbent directors to fill vacancies can serve as an anti-takeover device, precluding shareholders from filling the board until the next regular election.
G. **Proposals to Fix the Size of the Board**

AWM policy is to vote:

1. “For” proposals to fix the size of the board unless: (a) no specific reason for the proposed change is given; or (b) the proposal is part of a package of takeover defenses.

2. “Against” proposals allowing management to fix the size of the board without shareholder approval.

Rationale: Absent danger of anti-takeover use, companies should be granted a reasonable amount of flexibility in fixing the size of its board.

H. **Proposals to Restrict Chief Executive Officer’s Service on Multiple Boards**

AWM policy is to vote “For” proposals to restrict a Chief Executive Officer from serving on more than three outside boards of directors.

Rationale: Chief Executive Officer must have sufficient time to ensure that shareholders’ interests are represented adequately.

Note: A director’s service on multiple closed-end fund boards within a fund complex are treated as service on a single Board for the purpose of the proxy voting guidelines.

I. **Proposals to Restrict Supervisory Board Members Service on Multiple Boards (For FFT Securities)**

AWM policy is to vote “for” proposals to restrict a Supervisory Board Member from serving on more than five supervisory boards.

Rationale: We consider a strong, independent and knowledgeable supervisory board as important counter-balance to executive management to ensure that the interests of shareholders are fully reflected by the company.

Full information should be disclosed in the annual reports and accounts to allow all shareholders to judge the success of the supervisory board controlling their company.

Supervisory Board Member must have sufficient time to ensure that shareholders’ interests are represented adequately.

Note: A director’s service on multiple closed-end fund boards within a fund complex are treated as service on a single Board for the purpose of the proxy voting guidelines.

J. **Proposals to Establish Audit Committees (For FFT and U.S. Securities)**

AWM policy is to vote “for” proposals that require the establishment of audit committees.

Rationale: The audit committee should deal with accounting and risk management related questions, verifies the independence of the auditor with due regard to possible conflicts of interest. It also should determine the procedure of the audit process.
II. Capital Structure

A. Authorization of Additional Shares (For U.S. Securities)

AWM policy is to vote “for” proposals to increase the authorization of existing classes of stock that do not exceed a 3:1 ratio of shares authorized to shares outstanding for a large cap company, and do not exceed a 4:1 ratio of shares authorized to shares outstanding for a small-midcap company (companies having a market capitalization under one billion U.S. dollars.).

Rationale: While companies need an adequate number of shares in order to carry on business, increases requested for general financial flexibility must be limited to protect shareholders from their potential use as an anti-takeover device. Requested increases for specifically designated, reasonable business purposes (stock split, merger, etc.) will be considered in light of those purposes and the number of shares required.

B. Authorization of “Blank Check” Preferred Stock (For U.S. Securities)

AWM policy is to vote:

1. “Against” proposals to create blank check preferred stock or to increase the number of authorized shares of blank check preferred stock unless the company expressly states that the stock will not be used for anti-takeover purposes and will not be issued without shareholder approval.

2. “For” proposals mandating shareholder approval of blank check stock placement.

Rationale: Shareholders should be permitted to monitor the issuance of classes of preferred stock in which the board of directors is given unfettered discretion to set voting, dividend, conversion and other rights for the shares issued.

C. Stock Splits/Reverse Stock Splits

AWM policy is to vote “for” stock splits if a legitimate business purpose is set forth and the split is in the shareholders' best interests. A vote is cast “for” a reverse stock split only if the number of shares authorized is reduced in the same proportion as the reverse split or if the effective increase in authorized shares (relative to outstanding shares) complies with the proxy guidelines for common stock increases (see, Section II.A, above.)

Rationale: Generally, stock splits do not detrimentally effect shareholders. Reverse stock splits, however, may have the same result as an increase in authorized shares and should be analyzed accordingly.

D. Dual Class/Supervoting Stock

AWM policy is to vote “against” proposals to create or authorize additional shares of super-voting stock or stock with unequal voting rights.

Rationale: The “one share, one vote” principal ensures that no shareholder maintains a voting interest exceeding their equity interest in the company.
E. Large Block Issuance (For U.S. Securities)

AWM policy is to address large block issuances of stock on a case-by-case basis, incorporating the recommendation of an independent third party proxy research firm (currently ISS) subject to review by the GPVSC as set forth in AWM’s Proxy Policies and Procedures.

Additionally, AWM supports proposals requiring shareholder approval of large block issuances.

Rationale: Stock issuances must be reviewed in light of the business circumstances leading to the request and the potential impact on shareholder value.

F. Recapitalization into a Single Class of Stock

AWM policy is to vote “for” recapitalization plans to provide for a single class of common stock, provided the terms are fair, with no class of stock being unduly disadvantaged.

Rationale: Consolidation of multiple classes of stock is a business decision that may be left to the board and/or management if there is no adverse effect on shareholders.

G. Share Repurchases

AWM policy is to vote “for” share repurchase plans provided all shareholders are able to participate on equal terms.

Rationale: Buybacks are generally considered beneficial to shareholders because they tend to increase returns to the remaining shareholders.

H. Reductions in Par Value

AWM policy is to vote “for” proposals to reduce par value, provided a legitimate business purpose is stated (e.g., the reduction of corporate tax responsibility.)

Rationale: Usually, adjustments to par value are a routine financial decision with no substantial impact on shareholders.

III. Corporate Governance Issues

A. Confidential Voting

AWM policy is to vote “for” proposals to provide for confidential voting and independent tabulation of voting results and to vote “against” proposals to repeal such provisions.

Rationale: Confidential voting protects the privacy rights of all shareholders. This is particularly important for employee-shareholders or shareholders with business or other affiliations with the company, who may be vulnerable to coercion or retaliation when opposing management. Confidential voting does not interfere with the ability of corporations to communicate with all shareholders, nor does it prohibit shareholders from making their views known directly to management.
B. Cumulative Voting (For U.S. Securities)

AWM policy is to vote “against” shareholder proposals requesting cumulative voting and “for” management proposals to eliminate it. The protections afforded shareholders by cumulative voting are not necessary when a company has a history of good performance and does not have a concentrated ownership interest. Accordingly, a vote is cast “against” cumulative voting and “for” proposals to eliminate it if:

a) The company has a five year return on investment greater than the relevant industry index,

b) All directors and executive officers as a group beneficially own less than 10% of the outstanding stock, and

c) No shareholder (or voting block) beneficially owns 15% or more of the company.

Thus, failure of any one of the three criteria results in a vote for cumulative voting in accordance with the general policy.

Rationale: Cumulative voting is a tool that should be used to ensure that holders of a significant number of shares may have board representation; however, the presence of other safeguards may make their use unnecessary.

C. Supermajority Voting Requirements

AWM policy is to vote “against” management proposals to require a supermajority vote to amend the charter or bylaws and to vote “for” shareholder proposals to modify or rescind existing supermajority requirements.

*Exception made when company holds a controlling position and seeks to lower threshold to maintain control and/or make changes to corporate by-laws.

Rationale: Supermajority voting provisions violate the democratic principle that a simple majority should carry the vote. Setting supermajority requirements may make it difficult or impossible for shareholders to remove egregious by-law or charter provisions. Occasionally, a company with a significant insider held position might attempt to lower a supermajority threshold to make it easier for management to approve provisions that may be detrimental to shareholders. In that case, it may not be in the shareholders interests to lower the supermajority provision.

D. Shareholder Right to Vote

AWM policy is to vote “against” proposals that restrict the right of shareholders to call special meetings, amend the bylaws, or act by written consent. Policy is to vote “for” proposals that remove such restrictions.

Rationale: Any reasonable means whereby shareholders can make their views known to management or effect the governance process should be supported.
IV. Compensation

Annual Incentive Plans or Bonus Plans are often submitted to shareholders for approval. These plans typically award cash to executives based on company performance. Deutsche Bank believes that the responsibility for executive compensation decisions rest with the board of directors and/or the compensation committee, and its policy is not to second-guess the board’s award of cash compensation amounts to executives unless a particular award or series of awards is deemed excessive. If stock options are awarded as part of these bonus or incentive plans, the provisions must meet Deutsche Bank’s criteria regarding stock option plans, or similar stock-based incentive compensation schemes, as set forth below.

A. Establishment of a Remuneration Committee (For FFT Securities)

AWM policy is to vote “for” proposals that require the establishment of a remuneration committee.

Rationale: Corporations should disclose in each annual report or proxy statement their policies on remuneration. Essential details regarding executive remuneration including share options, long-term incentive plans and bonuses, should be disclosed in the annual report, so that investors can judge whether corporate pay policies and practices meet the standard.

The remuneration committee shall not comprise any board members and should be sensitive to the wider scene on executive pay. It should ensure that performance-based elements of executive pay are designed to align the interests of shareholders.

B. Executive and Director Stock Option Plans

AWM policy is to vote “for” stock option plans that meet the following criteria:

1. The resulting dilution of existing shares is less than (a) 15 percent of outstanding shares for large capital corporations or (b) 20 percent of outstanding shares for small-mid capital companies (companies having a market capitalization under one billion U.S. dollars.)

2. The transfer of equity resulting from granting options at less than FMV is no greater than 3% of the over-all market capitalization of large capital corporations, or 5% of market cap for small-mid capital companies.

3. The plan does not contain express repricing provisions and, in the absence of an express statement that options will not be repriced; the company does not have a history of repricing options.

4. The plan does not grant options on super-voting stock.

AWM will support performance-based option proposals as long as a) they do not mandate that all options granted by the company must be performance based, and b) only certain high-level executives are subject to receive the performance based options.

AWM will support proposals to eliminate the payment of outside director pensions.
Rationale: Determining the cost to the company and to shareholders of stock-based incentive plans raises significant issues not encountered with cash-based compensation plans. These include the potential dilution of existing shareholders' voting power, the transfer of equity out of the company resulting from the grant and execution of options at less than FMV and the authority to reprice or replace underwater options. Our stock option plan analysis model seeks to allow reasonable levels of flexibility for a company yet still protect shareholders from the negative impact of excessive stock compensation. Acknowledging that small mid-capital corporations often rely more heavily on stock option plans as their main source of executive compensation and may not be able to compete with their large capital competitors with cash compensation, we provide slightly more flexibility for those companies.

C. Employee Stock Option/Purchase Plans

AWM policy is to vote for employee stock purchase plans (ESPP's) when the plan complies with Internal Revenue Code 423, allowing non-management employees to purchase stock at 85% of FMV.

AWM policy is to vote “for” employee stock option plans (ESOPs) provided they meet the standards for stock option plans in general. However, when computing dilution and transfer of equity, ESOPs are considered independently from executive and director option plans.

Rationale: ESOPs and ESPP’s encourage rank-and-file employees to acquire an ownership stake in the companies they work for and have been shown to promote employee loyalty and improve productivity.

D. Golden Parachutes

AWM policy is to vote “for” proposals to require shareholder approval of golden parachutes and for proposals that would limit golden parachutes to no more than three times base compensation. Policy is to vote “against” more restrictive shareholder proposals to limit golden parachutes.

Rationale: In setting a reasonable limitation, AWM considers that an effective parachute should be less attractive than continued employment and that the IRS has opined that amounts greater than three times annual salary, are excessive.

E. Proposals to Limit Benefits or Executive Compensation

AWM policy is to vote “against”

1. Proposals to limit benefits, pensions or compensation and

2. Proposals that request or require disclosure of executive compensation greater than the disclosure required by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations.

Rationale: Levels of compensation and benefits are generally considered to be day-to-day operations of the company, and are best left unrestricted by arbitrary limitations proposed by shareholders.

F. Option Expensing

AWM policy is to support proposals requesting companies to expense stock options.
Rationale: Although companies can choose to expense options voluntarily, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) does not yet require it, instead allowing companies to disclose the theoretical value of options as a footnote. Because the expensing of stock options lowers earnings, most companies elect not to do so. Given the fact that options have become an integral component of compensation and their exercise results in a transfer of shareholder value, AWM agrees that their value should not be ignored and treated as “no cost” compensation. The expensing of stock options would promote more modest and appropriate use of stock options in executive compensation plans and present a more accurate picture of company operational earnings.

G. Management board election and motion (For FFT Securities)

AWM policy is to vote “against”:

• the election of board members with positions on either remuneration or audit committees;
• the election of supervisory board members with too many supervisory board mandates;
• “automatic” election of former board members into the supervisory board.

Rationale: Management as an entity, and each of its members, are responsible for all actions of the company, and are subject to applicable laws and regulations - accountable to the shareholders as a whole for their actions.

Sufficient information should be disclosed in the annual company report and account to allow shareholders to judge the success of the company.

H. Remuneration (variable pay): (For FFT Securities)

Executive remuneration for Management Board

AWM policy is to vote “for” remuneration for Management Board that is transparent and linked to results.

Rationale: Executive compensation should motivate management and align the interests of management with the shareholders. The focus should be on criteria that prevent excessive remuneration; but enable the company to hire and retain first-class professionals.

Shareholder interests are normally best served when management is remunerated to optimise long-term returns. Criteria should include suitable measurements like return on capital employed or economic value added.

Interests should generally also be correctly aligned when management own shares in the company – even more so if these shares represent a substantial portion of their own wealth.

Its disclosure shall differentiate between fixed pay, variable (performance related) pay and long-term incentives, including stock option plans with valuation ranges as well as pension and any other significant arrangements.

Executive remuneration for Supervisory Board

AWM policy is to vote “for” remuneration for Supervisory Board that is at least 50% in fixed form.

Rationale: It would normally be preferable if performance linked compensation were not based on dividend payments, but linked to suitable result based parameters. Consulting and procurement services should also be published in the company report.
I. **Long-term incentive plans (For FFT Securities)**

AWM policy is to vote “for” long-term incentive plans for members of a management board that reward for above average company performance.

Rationale: Incentive plans will normally be supported if they:

- directly align the interests of members of management boards with those of shareholders;
- establish challenging performance criteria to reward only above average performance;
- measure performance by total shareholder return in relation to the market or a range of comparable companies;
- are long-term in nature and encourage long-term ownership of the shares once exercised through minimum holding periods;
- do not allow a repricing of the exercise price in stock option plans.

J. **Shareholder Proposals Concerning “Pay for Superior Performance”**

AWM policy is to address pay for superior performance proposals on a case-by-case basis, incorporating the recommendation of an independent third party proxy research firm (currently ISS) subject to review by the GPVSC as set forth in AWM’s Proxy Policies and Procedures.

Rationale: While AWM agrees that compensation issues are better left to the discretion of management, they appreciate the need to monitor for excessive compensation practices on a case by case basis. If, after a review of the ISS metrics, AWM is comfortable with ISS’s applying this calculation and will vote according to their recommendation.

K. **Executive Compensation Advisory**

AWM policy is to follow management’s recommended vote on shareholder proposals to propose an advisory resolution seeking to ratify the compensation of the company’s named executive officers (NEOs) on an annual basis.

Rationale: AWM believes that controls exist within senior management and corporate compensation committees, ensuring fair compensation to executives. This might allow shareholders to require approval for all levels of management’s compensation.

L. **Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation**

AWM policy is to evaluate Executive Compensation proposals on a case-by-case basis, where locally defined this may be done by incorporating the recommendation of an independent third party proxy research firm. AWM will oppose Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation if:

- There is a significant misalignment between CEO pay and company performance;
- The company maintains significant problematic pay practices;
- The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

Rationale: While AWM agrees that compensation issues are better left to the discretion of management, they appreciate the need to take action on this nonbinding proposal if excessive compensation practices exist.

M. **Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation**

AWM policy is to vote “for” annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies' executive pay programs.

Rationale: AWM believes that annual advisory vote gives shareholders the opportunity to express any compensation concerns to the Executive Compensation proposal which is an advisory voting.
V. Anti-Takeover Related Issues

A. Shareholder Rights Plans (“Poison Pills”)

AWM policy is to vote “for” proposals to require shareholder ratification of poison pills or that request boards to redeem poison pills, and to vote “against” the adoption of poison pills if they are submitted for shareholder ratification.

Rationale: Poison pills are the most prevalent form of corporate takeover defenses and can be (and usually are) adopted without shareholder review or consent. The potential cost of poison pills to shareholders during an attempted takeover outweighs the benefits.

B. Reincorporation

AWM policy is to examine reincorporation proposals on a case-by-case basis. The voting decision is based on: (1) differences in state law between the existing state of incorporation and the proposed state of incorporation; and (2) differences between the existing and the proposed charter/bylaws/articles of incorporation and their effect on shareholder rights. If changes resulting from the proposed reincorporation violate the corporate governance principles set forth in these guidelines, the reincorporation will be deemed contrary to shareholder’s interests and a vote cast “against.”

Rationale: Reincorporations can be properly analyzed only by looking at the advantages and disadvantages to their shareholders. Care must be taken that anti-takeover protection is not the sole or primary result of a proposed change.

C. Fair-Price Proposals

AWM policy is to vote “for” management fair-price proposals, provided that: (1) the proposal applies only to two-tier offers; (2) the proposal sets an objective fair-price test based on the highest price that the acquirer has paid for a company's shares; (3) the supermajority requirement for bids that fail the fair-price test is no higher than two-thirds of the outstanding shares; (4) the proposal contains no other anti-takeover provisions or provisions that restrict shareholders rights.

A vote is cast for shareholder proposals that would modify or repeal existing fair-price requirements that do not meet these standards.

Rationale: While fair price provisions may be used as anti-takeover devices, if adequate provisions are included, they provide some protection to shareholders who have some say in their application and the ability to reject those protections if desired.

D. Exemption from state takeover laws

AWM policy is to vote “for” shareholder proposals to opt out of state takeover laws and to vote “against” management proposals requesting to opt out of state takeover laws.

Rationale: Control share statutes, enacted at the state level, may harm long-term share value by entrenching management. They also unfairly deny certain shares their inherent voting rights.
E. Non-financial Effects of Takeover Bids

Policy is to vote “against” shareholder proposals to require consideration of non-financial effects of merger or acquisition proposals.

Rationale: Non-financial effects may often be subjective and are secondary to AWM’s stated purpose of acting in its client’s best economic interest.

VI. Mergers & Acquisitions

Evaluation of mergers, acquisitions and other special corporate transactions (i.e., takeovers, spin-offs, sales of assets, reorganizations, restructurings and recapitalizations) are performed on a case-by-case basis incorporating information from an independent proxy research source (currently ISS.) Additional resources including portfolio management and research analysts may be considered as set forth in AWM’s Policies and Procedures.

VII. Environmental, Social & Governance Issues

Environmental, social and governance issues (“ESG”) are becoming increasingly important to corporate success. We incorporate ESG considerations into both our investment decisions and our proxy voting decisions – particularly if the financial performance of the company could be impacted. Companies or states that seriously contravene internationally accepted ethical principles will be subject to heightened scrutiny.

A. Principles for Responsible Investment

AWM policy is to actively engage with companies on ESG issues and participate in ESG initiatives. In this context, AWM (a) votes “for” increased disclosure on ESG issues; (b) is willing to participate in the development of policy, regulation and standard setting (such as promoting and protecting shareholder rights); (c) could support shareholder initiatives and also file shareholder resolutions with long term ESG considerations and improved ESG disclosure, when applicable; (d) could support standardized ESG reporting and issues to be integrated within annual financial reports; and (e) on a case by case basis, will generally follow management's recommended vote on other matters related to ESG issues.

Rationale: ESG issues can affect the performance of investment portfolios (to varying degrees across companies, sectors, regions, asset classes and through time).

B. ESG Issues

AWM policy is to vote in line with the CERES recommendation on Environmental matters covered under the CERES Principles, and Social and Sustainability issues not specifically addressed elsewhere in the Guidelines. AWM will rely on ISS to identify shareholder proposals addressing CERES Principles and proxies will be voted in accordance with ISS’s predetermined voting guidelines on CERES Principles.

Any matter that is to be voted on, consented to or approved by the voting members, may take place in person, telephonically or via other electronic means. In addition, voting members may act in writing, including without limitation, via e-mail.

Rationale: Deutsche Asset Management supports the CERES Principles and as such generally votes proxies in line with the CERES recommendation.
C. Labor & Human Rights

AWM policy is to vote “against” adopting global codes of conduct or workplace standards exceeding those mandated by law.

Rationale: Additional requirements beyond those mandated by law are deemed unnecessary and potentially burdensome to companies.

D. Diversity & Equality

1. AWM policy is to vote “against” shareholder proposals to force equal employment opportunity, affirmative action or board diversity.

Rationale: Compliance with State and Federal legislation along with information made available through filings with the EEOC provides sufficient assurance that companies act responsibly and make information public.

2. AWM policy is also to vote “against” proposals to adopt the Mac Bride Principles. The Mac Bride Principles promote fair employment, specifically regarding religious discrimination.

Rationale: Compliance with the Fair Employment Act of 1989 makes adoption of the Mac Bride Principles redundant. Their adoption could potentially lead to charges of reverse discrimination.

E. Health & Safety

1. AWM policy is to vote “against” adopting a pharmaceutical price restraint policy or reporting pricing policy changes.

Rationale: Pricing is an integral part of business for pharmaceutical companies and should not be dictated by shareholders (particularly pursuant to an arbitrary formula.) Disclosing pricing policies may also jeopardize a company’s competitive position in the marketplace.

2. AWM policy is to vote “against” shareholder proposals to control the use or labeling of and reporting on genetically engineered products.

Rationale: Additional requirements beyond those mandated by law are deemed unnecessary and potentially burdensome to companies.

F. Government/Military

1. AWM policy is to vote against shareholder proposals regarding the production or sale of military arms or nuclear or space-based weapons, including proposals seeking to dictate a company's interaction with a particular foreign country or agency.

Rationale: Generally, management is in a better position to determine what products or industries a company can and should participate in. Regulation of the production or distribution of military supplies is, or should be, a matter of government policy.

2. AWM policy is to vote “against” shareholder proposals regarding political contributions and donations.
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Rationale: The Board of Directors and Management, not shareholders, should evaluate and determine the recipients of any contributions made by the company.

3. AWM policy is to vote “against” shareholder proposals regarding charitable contributions and donations.

Rationale: The Board of Directors and Management, not shareholders, should evaluate and determine the recipients of any contributions made by the company.

G. Tobacco

1. AWM policy is to vote “against” shareholder proposals requesting additional standards or reporting requirements for tobacco companies as well as “against” requesting companies to report on the intentional manipulation of nicotine content.

Rationale: Where a tobacco company’s actions meet the requirements of legal and industry standards, imposing additional burdens may detrimentally effect a company's ability to compete. The disclosure of nicotine content information could affect the company's rights in any pending or future litigation.

2. Shareholder requests to spin-off or restructure tobacco businesses will be opposed.

Rationale: These decisions are more appropriately left to the Board and management, and not to shareholder mandate.

VIII. Miscellaneous Items

A. Ratification of Auditors

AWM policy is to vote “for” a) the management recommended selection of auditors and b) proposals to require shareholder approval of auditors.

Rationale: Absent evidence that auditors have not performed their duties adequately, support for management’s nomination is warranted.

B. Limitation of non-audit services provided by independent auditor

AWM policy is to support proposals limiting non-audit fees to 50% of the aggregate annual fees earned by the firm retained as a company's independent auditor.

Rationale: In the wake of financial reporting problems and alleged audit failures at a number of companies, AWM supports the general principle that companies should retain separate firms for audit and consulting services to avoid potential conflicts of interest. However, given the protections afforded by the recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (which requires Audit Committee pre-approval for non-audit services and prohibits auditors from providing specific types of services), and the fact that some non-audit services are legitimate audit-related services, complete separation of audit and consulting fees may not be warranted. A reasonable limitation is appropriate to help ensure auditor independence and it is reasonable to expect that audit fees exceed non-audit fees.
C. Audit firm rotation

AWM policy is to vote against proposals seeking audit firm rotation.

Rationale: While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates that the lead audit partner be switched every five years, AWM believes that rotation of the actual audit firm would be costly and disruptive.

D. Transaction of Other Business

AWM policy is to vote against “transaction of other business” proposals.

Rationale: This is a routine item to allow shareholders to raise other issues and discuss them at the meeting. As the nature of these issues may not be disclosed prior to the meeting, we recommend a vote against these proposals. This protects shareholders voting by proxy (and not physically present at a meeting) from having action taken at the meeting that they did not receive proper notification of or sufficient opportunity to consider.

E. Motions to Adjourn the Meeting

AWM Policy is to vote against proposals to adjourn the meeting.

Rationale: Management may seek authority to adjourn the meeting if a favorable outcome is not secured. Shareholders should already have had enough information to make a decision. Once votes have been cast, there is no justification for management to continue spending time and money to press shareholders for support.

F. Bundled Proposals

AWM policy is to vote against bundled proposals if any bundled issue would require a vote against it if proposed individually.

Rationale: Shareholders should not be forced to “take the good with the bad” in cases where the proposals could reasonably have been submitted separately.

G. Change of Company Name

AWM policy is to support management on proposals to change the company name.

Rationale: This is generally considered a business decision for a company.

H. Proposals Related to the Annual Meeting

AWM Policy is to vote in favor of management for proposals related to the conduct of the annual meeting (meeting time, place, etc.)

Rationale: These are considered routine administrative proposals.
I. **Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred from Candidate Nomination**

AWM policy is to follow management’s recommended vote on shareholder proposals related to the amending of company bylaws to provide for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a contested election of directors to the corporation’s board of directors.

Rationale: Corporations should not be liable for costs associated with shareholder proposals for directors.

J. **Investment Company Proxies**

Proxies solicited by investment companies are voted in accordance with the recommendations of an independent third party, currently ISS. However, regarding investment companies for which AWM or an affiliate serves as investment adviser or principal underwriter, such proxies are voted in the same proportion as the vote of all other shareholders. Proxies solicited by master funds from feeder funds will be voted in accordance with applicable provisions of Section 12 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.

Investment companies, particularly closed-end investment companies, are different from traditional operating companies. These differences may call for differences in voting positions on the same matter. For example, AWM could vote “for” staggered boards of closed-end investment companies, although AWM generally votes “against” staggered boards for operating companies. Further, the manner in which AWM votes investment company proxies may differ from proposals for which a AWM-advised investment company solicits proxies from its shareholders. As reflected in the Guidelines, proxies solicited by closed-end (and open-end) investment companies are voted in accordance with the pre-determined guidelines of an independent third-party.

Subject to participation agreements with certain Exchange Traded Funds (“ETF”) issuers that have received exemptive orders from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission allowing investing DWS funds to exceed the limits set forth in Section 12(d)(1)(A) and (B) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, AWM will echo vote proxies for ETFs in which Deutsche Bank holds more than 25% of outstanding voting shares globally when required to do so by participation agreements and SEC orders.

Note: With respect to the Central Cash Management Fund (registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940), the Fund is not required to engage in echo voting and the investment adviser will use these Guidelines, and may determine, with respect to the Central Cash Management Fund, to vote contrary to the positions in the Guidelines, consistent with the Fund’s best interest.

K. **International Proxy Voting**

The above guidelines pertain to issuers organized in the United States, Canada and Germany. Proxies solicited by other issuers are voted in accordance with international guidelines or the recommendation of ISS and in accordance with applicable law and regulation.